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Abstract 
 
In this article we review our study of 13,493 bot-like Twitter accounts that tweeted the U.K. European Union 
membership referendum and disappeared from the platform after the ballot. We discuss the methodological 
challenges and lessons learned from a study that emerged in a period of increasing weaponization of social 
media and mounting concerns about information warfare. We address the challenges and shortcomings 
involved in bot detection, the extent to which disinformation campaigns on social media are effective, valid 
metrics for user exposure, activation, and engagement in the context of disinformation campaigns, 
unsupervised and supervised posting protocols, along with infrastructure and ethical issues associated with 
social sciences research based on large-scale social media data. We argue for improving researchers’ access to 
data associated with contentious issues and suggest that social media platforms should offer public 
Application Programming Interfaces to allow researchers access to content generated on their networks. We 
conclude with reflections on the relevance of this research agenda to public policy. 
 
Main Text 
 
The Brexit Botnet 
In October 2017 we published an article detailing the activity patterns of a large cohort (13,493) of bot-like 
Twitter accounts that tweeted the U.K. European Union membership referendum and disappeared from the 
platform shortly after the ballot. The analysis of the Brexit Botnet [1] was part of a project to map the 
expression of ideological positions regarding Brexit on Twitter onto parliamentary constituencies. We had not 
envisioned inspecting bot activity in the Brexit debate; instead, we stumbled upon the problem when realizing 
that over 5% of the userbase that tweeted referendum-related hashtags had disappeared after the vote, a rate 
of account deletion that much exceeded patterns observed in previous studies implementing similar research 
designs. 
 
The article on the Brexit bots emerged in a context of increasing weaponization of social media platforms and 
a growing scrutiny of algorithms in which bots feature as the most simple, cost-effective, and flexible 
approach [2] to gaming the social media attention economy [3]. Between the end of 2017 and early 2018, social 
media platforms and intelligence agencies worldwide issued several reports detailing the state of information 
warfare on social media [4-7]. 
 
In this reflexive paper, we contemplate the aftermath of the publication of our article as a vehicle for public 
discussion intended to make the invisible visible [8]. We chart the path from publication of the analysis to the 
public attention it received and the engagement it generated against the backdrop of congressional and 
parliamentary inquiries in the U.S. and the U.K. into foreign interference in national elections. The findings of 
the study were reported in over 250 news articles and were referenced in a House of Commons Briefing Paper. 
The study was also cited as evidence in the House of Commons Debate on Russian Interference in U.K. 
Politics as well as in the House of Commons Fake News Inquiry led by the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 
Committee. The communication between the Committee Chair Damian Collins MP and Twitter, Inc. likewise 
dwelled on the topic of the botnet and the extent to which Twitter could corroborate its activity and pinpoint 
its provenance [9]. 
 
In what follows, we discuss the most salient challenges to this type of research, what we learned from the 
study, the extant hindrances impinging on advancing this research agenda and its relevance to public policy. 
We revisit the strategic use of bots, trolls, and sockpuppets in the context of social media warfare and unpack 
metrics of exposure and activation in a media ecosystem largely dependent on networking technology. We 
thus undertake a broader discussion of the original study along with suggestions for future research on the 
weaponization of social networking sites. While we are cognizant that social scientists may often be shunned 
by policy makers [10], we believe there are important lessons to be learned from a positive attempt at public 
engagement.  
 
The Art of Bot Detection 
Bots are automatic posting protocols used to relay content in a programmatic fashion. As such, bots are simple 
algorithms programmed to scrape data from internet sources and post them via social media platforms. 
Twitter is a relatively bot-friendly platform [11] and a number of prominent Twitter accounts are openly bots, 
including those of established news outlets relaying breaking news, earthquake and tsunami warning 
systems, or Twitter accounts operated by the Vatican offering regular reflections on Catholic devotion. In the 
political sphere, bots can be leveraged to impersonate a third-party and are associated with sockpuppets, 
which are false online identities used to voice opinions and manipulate public opinion while pretending to be 
another person [12]. 
 
Although bots rely on trivial computing routines, bot detection is not an exact science and neither human 
annotators nor machine-learning algorithms perform flawlessly [13]. While human coders are better at 
generalizing and learning new features from observed data, machine learning algorithms are scalable and 
regularly outperform human annotators in searching for and detecting complex patterns. Training a machine 
learning algorithm is however a trade-off between recall, the number of correct results divided by the number 
of possible results, and precision, the ratio of positive and relevant matches [14]. 
 
Despite these challenges, significant efforts have been made to detect patterns that pertain to bot activity and a 
growing catalogue of metrics exists for pinpointing political bots [15-17]. While bot detection was originally an 
enterprise devoted to the identification, demotion, and prevention of spam [18], it has since evolved to 
mitigate the detrimental impact of malicious activity on electoral politics, policy discussions, and the 
deliberation of contentious issues. There is compelling evidence that political bots produce systematically 
more positive content in support of a candidate [19] and only tweet hashtags used by opponents to disrupt 
their communication flow [20]. Bots identified in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Elections were effective 
information disseminators [19]. Similarly, during the E.U. referendum they focused on retweeting content 
from a selection of users [21], a marker of their potential to disseminate content. 
 
In our study, we identified at least two false positives flagged as bots that turned out to be human users, 
including the very central accounts of @nero, which was operated by the alt-right controversialist and 
professional troll Milo Yiannopoulos, and @steveemmensUKIP, a Norwich UKIP and Brexit campaigner. Both 
accounts were highly connected to the remainder of the botnet and disappeared within the same timeframe, 
thereby triggering our classifier which relied on thresholding and filtering methods. The number of false 
negatives in our study most certainly extends beyond these accounts, with similar studies estimating false 
positives and false negatives in bot detection to hover at around 26% of the data, or 11% and 15%, respectively 
[13]. These figures are comparable to the results of our study, as Twitter acknowledge having removed 71% of 
the accounts identified in our study due to violations of its spam policies [22]. 
 
The opportunities to leverage bots in disinformation campaigns by strategically amplifying divisive content 
began to be publicly debated in the wake of the 2016 U.S. Presidential elections. The discussion rapidly 
escalated to a public outcry against fake accounts and bots on social media. The ensuing uproar regarding bot 
activity is rooted in the perception that social networking sites are opaque platforms unaccountable to regular 
users and governments alike, with sentiments towards Twitter bots quickly taking a negative turn [23]. This 
development prompted a question that remains largely uncharted in the literature discussing the 
weaponization of social media information, namely, how impactful are bots in disinformation campaigns? 
 
Megaphone or Microphone 
One important component of our study was that it sought to measure the impact of bot-like accounts in the 
broader Brexit debate. We sought to identify whether bots were used to increase the reach of a given user’s 
message, much like a microphone, or deployed in a concerted effort to amplify a political narrative toward a 
targeted direction, much like a megaphone. After identifying accounts that both presented bot-like features 
and that disappeared shortly after the vote, we inspected the data to determine whether bots could generate 
greater or faster message cascades compared with active users. While it is not possible to rebuild every step of 
a retweet cascade, with independent entry points [24] not being reported by Twitter, we managed to identify 
seed messages and the temporal diffusion of the information. Using this method, we managed to rebuild 
retweet cascades from original to subsequent users that replicated the information. A variable time-to-retweet 
was calculated in a similar fashion, with the timestamp attached to each tweet offering the necessary 
information to estimate the time elapsed between the original tweet and the ith retweet for cascade of size S. 
 
The conclusions presented in our study were far less alarming than one would think by following the public 
debate about bots. Our study indicated that while bot-like accounts exhibited clear patterns of specialization 
that allowed them to trigger small to medium-sized cascades in a fraction of the time required by active users 
to start cascades of comparable size, there was no evidence supporting the notion that bots had substantively 
altered the Brexit debate on Twitter. Indeed, by all measures employed in our study, the activity of bot-like 
accounts was relatively minor with respect to the larger conversation about the referendum. Our findings 
indicated that bots can potentially amplify a subset of accounts, but that their influence in the network is 
limited and falls short of a megaphone, a result consistent with literature on cognitive dissonance reporting 
that political persuasion seems to have little effect in attitude change at the individual level [25, 26]. 
 
The abovementioned results presented in the original study were emphasized by Twitter, Inc. [27] in its 
response to the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, but they contributed little to offsetting public 
concerns about Russian trolls operating on social platforms. Facebook, a platform averse to bots and requiring 
real identities [28], resisted publicly releasing any data, thereby increasing concerns that the opaqueness of 
social media platforms shields disinformation campaigns. In this climate, a rapidly evolving public debate 
seems to have eschewed fundamental differences between bots, trolls, and sockpuppets [12]. One important 
caveat about the above assessment is that in distributed systems the exposure and activation triggered by 
messages, whether relayed by bots or otherwise, likely exceeds the population of users directly exposed to 
them. 
 
Activation and Network Effects 
Concerns raised by political bots often stem from the belief that targeted advertisement affects users in a 
uniform, atomized fashion. This understanding of media effects dates from early communication research 
asserting that the media exerts a powerful and persuasive influence on audiences who were believed to be 
volatile, alienated, and inherently susceptible to manipulation. This framework is known as the hypodermic 
needle model [29] on account of portraying all-powerful messages being “injected” into easy-prey and 
suggestible individuals [30]. In the post-war period this framework was rebuked and eventually replaced by 
the two-step flow of communication, a model emphasizing the importance of opinion leaders and 
interpersonal communication in the flow of personal influence leading to the promotion of ideas and products 
[31]. 
 
It is unsurprising that the framework used in propaganda studies continues to rely on the two-step flow of 
communication model [31], thereby foregrounding the role of opinion leaders whose influence in their 
community is a vector of social persuasion. This model continues to provide a dependable framework for 
studying Twitter [32], a social network largely populated by opinion leaders and in particular by the 
digiterati, and Instagram, a mobile photo-sharing app particularly suited to influencer marketing [33]. But the 
topology of social media platforms, which can accommodate various network formations, has modified the 
relatively simple equation in which persuasion is a function of activation, reinforcement, and conversion, as 
secondary network effects are not sufficiently developed in classic models of interpersonal communication 
[34] and information diffusion theory [35]. 
 
In other words, the assessment of campaign effects continues to rely on the assumption of independence to 
estimate the impact of exposure to partisan content on voting preferences. Political campaigns are expected to 
result in activation, when unmotivated actors confirm their support to the campaign; conversion, when 
motivated actors shift their vote to the opposing party; and reinforcement, when the initial vote preference is 
strengthened due to the campaign [34]. The assumption of independence underpinning campaign effects is 
correspondingly explored with fixed effects models [36], with exposure to campaign materials leading 
individuals to activate subsequent actors within their reach. Lazarsfeld resorted to the metaphors of 
photographic development and the rubbing of a coin to describe activation as the emergence of an ideological 
alignment that existed in latent form but only crystallised because of campaign propaganda, thereby tracing a 
linear path from voter’s latent tendencies to activation or conversion. 
 
The two step flow model is remarkably nuanced and downplays the power of propaganda epitomized by the 
hypodermic needle model [29]. It explores the subtle relationship between political communications broadcast 
by mass media and the direct personal influences exerted by activated individuals. It also describes how 
successful activation leads to increasing exposure in a continuous process, with propaganda leading to 
increased interest which in turn makes individuals more willing to expose themselves to further propaganda. 
The model nonetheless assumes exposure to be linear: either it flows from the media or is acquired through 
personal contacts. Relationships and interactions are thereby defined within the constraints of one’s personal 
ego network, with no way of accounting for hundreds of millions of dynamic new ties forged and reinforced 
online through social platforms. 
 
The problem is compounded by social networking sites whose internal topology is constantly shifting due to a 
growing userbase and successive modifications to the underlying technologies underpinning them. The small-
world properties of physical social networks are one of many topologies found on social platforms, which 
allow for multiple secondary exposures and network effects drawing from single exposure points. As such, 
the potential impact of messages circulating in social networks cannot be benchmarked against the number of 
users exposed to the content, as activation might be achieved through subsequent steps through which 
information cascades extrapolate the assumptions of mass communication and propaganda models [31]. 
 
Cumulative Exposure and Disengagement 
While Facebook is largely structured as a social network with reciprocal ties and overlapping clusters similar 
to physical social networks [37], Twitter is a mixed system that can rapidly shift from decentralized, horizontal 
networks to highly-centralized network formations, with few accounts sourcing information to communities 
of users [38]. The constantly changing topology of social platforms imposes considerable challenges to 
studying disinformation campaigns, but these constraints could be offset by incorporating network sciences 
methods to the task of identifying activation thresholds [39]. Network science can trace the processes through 
which disinformation navigates centralized and small-world networks to maximize the effects of information 
dissemination [40]. 
 
But even metrics of persuasion such as activation and conversion have limited heuristic power for 
understanding information warfare. Not only can activation occur due to secondary network effects, but 
propaganda campaigns can successfully employ psychological warfare techniques that bypass activation 
altogether. While researchers can track activation times of individuals recruited to political causes up to the 
moment when critical mass is attained [41], psychological warfare techniques do not require a given threshold 
of actors to be activated, as the target is shaping perceptions and manipulating cognitions which can be 
achieved without change being registered in the public discourse [42, 43]. The objective of psychological 
warfare is not to move public opinion, but to create confusion, disorder, and distrust [42, 44]. 
 
The potential reach of propaganda resorting to broadcast channels such as radio and television is restricted to 
the population exposed to it and the interactions between activated individuals and their social networks. 
Social platforms however incorporate network externalities [45], so that users subjected to microtargeted 
propaganda are also likely to be embedded in cliques or communities equally exposed to the campaign, 
thereby snowballing the cumulative impression garnered by the piece. In addition to bandwagon effects, 
network externalities also impinge on an individual’s ability to evaluate the extent to which an opinion is 
prevailing or dissenting relative to the broader population. These externalities can play a pivotal role in 
breaking the critical mass threshold after which social diffusion of new styles of behaviour grows rapidly [46]. 
 
These problems have long been studied in research of opinion evolution that foregrounds the non-linear 
patterns through which opinions and social change emerge from system interactions. While opinion dynamics 
are relatively simple, they often lead to nonlinearities and complex dynamic behaviour, of which clustering 
(i.e., “bubbles”) and the polarization of opinions are common outcomes [47, 48]. Disinformation campaigns 
thrive on polarized discourses by mobilizing supporters in opposing clusters, but clusters do not have to 
convince each other of a prevailing or a minority opinion. In other words, disinformation campaigns are not 
intended to change the prevailing opinion, and therefore metrics of persuasion, including activation and 
conversion, provide limited heuristic guidance regarding such operations. For social issues requiring 
engagement such as voting and public deliberation, disengagement is as important an objective as 
engagement and can be achieved with limited activation. 
 
In summary, while changing public opinion is a process governed by intrinsic dynamics, the transition to a 
new prevailing opinion is likely linked to changes in extrinsic control factors that affect intrinsic dynamics 
[49]. If an organization seeks to optimize the reach of their campaign, they might resort to a social platform as 
an information diffusion system and target “influentials”—i.e., users that are central to the network and 
perform the role of hubs relaying information to the periphery of the network. Trolls and botmasters do not 
necessarily have to convince “influentials” of their political agenda. For disinformation purposes, it might 
suffice that opinion leaders inhabiting the network perceive one side of the public debate as contentious and 
potentially damaging. The result is not a change in the prevailing opinion, but a change in public support for a 
cause that can well translate to disenchantment, apathy, and lower voter turnout by an ill-informed electorate. 
Originally derived from intelligence operations but employed in electoral campaigns worldwide [50], these 
adaptive strategies can skew public opinion without reaching the critical threshold for opinion formation. 
 
Unsupervised and Supervised Automation 
Equally important, the distinction between automated and supervised information warfare has remained 
peripheral to public deliberations. Surpassing bots in complexity and capillarity in the communities they 
operate, supervised accounts (e.g., trolls) were pivotal in the successful disinformation campaign led by the 
Kremlin-linked and St Petersburg based Internet Research Agency. This campaign relied primarily on 
supervised accounts operating on Facebook [51], a sharp contrast to the desolate life of Twitterbots 
communicating with each other and with modest impact outside their bubbles. The contrast between the two 
covert strategies raises topical questions about human-driven, curated, and supervised high-volume posting 
and conversely, automated, unsupervised, and scripted machine bots. Supervised high-volume posting 
encapsulates a new agent in the political arena to which little attention has been given beyond Reddit forums 
and the toxic corners of internet culture [52]. 
 
While bots and trolls continue to be described in the press as comparable forces undermining and reshaping 
political campaigning, there are fundamental differences we first identified in our studies of serial activists, 
who exhibited extraordinary levels of posting activity combined with a savvy strategy for activating opinion 
leaders such as journalists while at the same time assisting activists to coordinate across national boundaries 
and protest sites [53, 54]. This pattern of activity foreshadowed a complex modality of engagement that 
bridged actions online and onsite at multiple protest locations, an astute and publicly visible modus operandi 
that may have been readily repurposed for sophisticated covert disinformation campaigns. This is in line with 
early reports of the effective disinformation campaign led by the Internet Research Agency, whose operatives 
galvanized partisan communication online and agitated for rallies across the U.S., often contacting campaign 
staff members in various U.S. states and appealing to individuals to take their grievances to the streets [55].  
 
Conceivably, those operatives may well have relied on bots in their operations. We believe further research is 
necessary to determine the ramifications of the bifurcated communication modality fathered by serial activists, 
a strategy that sits alongside but often counters automated, unsupervised, and scripted posting protocols 
typified by bots by employing transparent operational tactics. One objective common to both automated and 
supervised activity is increasing the likelihood of activation. While bots might present potential for generating 
larger exposure, the benefits of network effects can only be achieved when multiple agents are coordinated 
through endogenous activation [56]. 
 
The Infrastructure of Social Platforms 
Disinformation strategies centred around inflammatory social media messaging constitute a pressing research 
agenda for social scientists, notwithstanding the methodological challenges discussed in the previous sections. 
Social media platforms have however largely refused to share publicly data related to disinformation 
campaigns that could provide fundamental insights into the strategies of botmasters, trolls, and sockpuppets 
alike. While continuing to reject any role as a media company or content provider, social media platforms 
rarely offer access to data of public interest and disavow public and academic expectations about the release of 
data. In the meantime, social platforms and Facebook in particular are continuously building a complex 
apparatus of content moderation and user governance that enforce a set of opaque guidelines to public 
discourse with no public or external expert supervision, a development increasingly adopted by other social 
platforms seeking more control at the cost of incentivising innovation [57]. 
 
Our study of the Brexit botnet was only possible because Twitter operates three well documented, public 
Application Programming Interfaces in addition to their Premium and Enterprise APIs. But public and open 
APIs remain an exception in the social media ecosystem that largely operates in secrecy, with Facebook’s 
Public Feed API being restricted to a limited set of media publishers that still require prior approval by 
Facebook [58]. Facebook’s secrecy also extends to the algorithms used to feed information to users in their 
network. Despite scholarly efforts in algorithm auditing [59], social media algorithms remain largely opaque 
to public scrutiny; similarly, the criteria underpinning algorithmic decisions on what news stories are 
distributed to users are intellectual property and therefore unaccountable to the public [60]. 
 
Social platforms consequently occupy the centre of a media ecosystem that allows hyper segmentation of 
social groups and highly targeted political communication with customizable messages that are invisible to 
the broader public [61]. This infrastructure emerged from a context in which social platforms remain private 
enclosures even in the aftermath of the weaponization of social networking sites [51]. There have so far been 
no efforts from their part to create publicly-accessible data repositories for researchers studying public 
communication associated with contentious issues or disinformation campaigns deployed by state actors and 
affiliated organizations. Conversely, the scholarly debate over access to social media data is largely focused on 
individuals’ rights not to have their information harvested by corporations, with comparatively less thought 
given to the corporate ownership of information of public interest. Indeed, researchers continue to face 
mounting obstacles erected by social media companies that at times have actively blocked access even to 
publicly available data [62]. On the rare occasions when data were made available to the public, the dataset 
was anonymously released due to being in breach of Twitter’s Developer Policy [63]. 
 
Notwithstanding data grants previously offered to research institutions [64], exiting public APIs are in fact not 
designed for the academic community. These endpoints for data collection are intended for programmers 
building application software that add to the growing ecosystem of services offered by social platforms, 
whose business model remains focused on selling users’ data by making them available to advertisers and 
campaigners targeting individuals with specifically tailored content, a vulnerability under close scrutiny in the 
wake of the Cambridge Analytica data scandal [50]. Social platforms thus balance the untenable task of 
convincing regulators that rampant propaganda on social platforms is ineffective while telling advertisers the 
very opposite. Concurrently, social platforms refuse being classified as media companies because they are in 
the business of distributing rather than producing content [6]. In other words, the business model of social 
platforms asserts that they simultaneously own users’ information while not being responsible for it, thereby 
evading concerns regarding both the publicness and the private nature of social data. 
 
Ethical Dilemmas in Social Media Research 
The ethics debate over issues surrounding the use of research data collected from social platforms are largely 
conceived as a struggle to protect realms of private life from the burgeoning technologies of surveillance and 
control, a surprising development that united fundamentally different sensibilities about what privacy means 
in the United States and the countries of Western Europe [65]. While Twitter Privacy Policy states its services 
are public and that private accounts are removed from data streamed through Twitter’s Streaming API [66], 
critical data studies have highlighted the risks that public trace data pose to the subjectivity of individual 
users. Although public, users might hold a reasonable expectation that the publicness of their activities will 
not infringe on their privacy or make them vulnerable to unintended scrutiny and even abuse [67], an 
expectation only likely to grow in the aftermath of the Cambridge Analytica data scandal [50]. 
 
The potential vulnerability of users engaging in politically-charged debates poses important ethical 
challenges. Many of the Twitter handles flagged as Brexit bots included important information to the story we 
sought to tell, including political slogans, party or campaign affiliation, and ideological leanings. The 
semantics of usernames was thus an important part of the story leading us to identify 11 handles of suspected 
bots (e.g., EuFear and @no_eusssr_thx). After putting in balance the risks of false positives and the fact that the 
accounts had disappeared from the platform shortly after the vote, we decided to disclose the Twitter handles 
in the interest of accountability. We did so whenever there was a reasonable level of confidence that we were 
dealing with Twitterbots, to which ethical considerations of privacy are immaterial. Yet, we are cognizant of at 
least two false positives in our study. These accounts were nonetheless important to the story due to their 
central position in the bot network and their role in sourcing content to bots. We also recognise that the claim 
of account automation was not intrinsically harmful as it is not in breach of Twitter Terms of Service. 
 
These considerations can only be properly managed within the context of the research, namely the public 
debate unfolding in the period leading up to the U.K. E.U. membership referendum. In that context, we faced 
the challenge of analysing data that could potentially reveal activities detrimental to the functioning of 
democratic institutions. In our case, specifically, it was only in January 2018 that we learned from the 
Parliamentary investigators that Twitter had suspended over 70 percent of the accounts in the botnet we 
identified. While not constituting direct proof of the automation of those accounts, the statement by Twitter, 
Inc. provided a partial external validation of our research findings, testifying to the disruptive character of the 
communication they instigated. Indeed, Twitter’s response to the Parliamentary enquiry states that a large 
section of those accounts was suspended because their conduct was in breach of Twitter’s Spam Policy. 
 
In the end, the most pressing ethical issue faced in our original study was the obligation not to display deleted 
Tweets. After long deliberation we decided that the content of the study was of public and scholarly interest. 
It shed light on a large botnet that participated in a politically contentious debate. Therefore, the social benefits 
of the research superseded user rights to not have their deleted tweets made public [68], which we deemed 
immaterial in the case of bots. In our case, we identified users positioned at the core of the botnet and only 
quoted retweets verbatim if the original tweet had amassed a minimum of 500 retweets, thus avoiding the risk 
of exposing potentially unnoticed content. We also removed the username that authored the content and 
identified retweets as exchanges between active users and/or bots. For this cohort of accounts, and regardless 
of the level of automation involved, we expected users to have a clear sense of the publicness of their quoted 
posts. 
 
Conclusions 
Research exploring the weaponization of social platforms is an embryonic field advancing multiple metrics of 
networked information warfare. This emerging field continues to struggle with scant and incomplete data due 
to corporate regulations governing access to public communication data. So long as data of public interest are 
held by private companies embodied by social platforms, researchers will continue to face considerable 
challenges to cultivate practices of open data and replicability [69], tenets of high-quality data-driven research 
without which the field is likely to be diminished in scope and depth while also failing to engage independent 
academic researchers devoted to an issue of growing public interest. 
 
The public reception of our analysis provides a counterfactual to the notion that scholarly insights into 
unfolding social transformations garner little traction in an attention economy marked by elevated elite 
competition between newsmakers, pundits, political actors, and academics [10]. The response to our paper 
was both meaningful and sustained, while also throwing into relief the importance of research that is both 
professionally and publicly accountable [8]. While anxieties regarding the relevance and impact of social 
science research to emerging societal issues are warranted [10], we have sought to address some of the 
challenges we encountered at the level of individual scholarship. 
 
Academics are no exception in requiring a substantial amount of time to conduct research and summarize it in 
reports for public review. Both British and American legislators found themselves in the same position when 
investigating the charges of Russian interference in the democratic process in the two countries. We struggled 
with the lag between the real-time event, media coverage, public debate, and academic research, but the 
timeframes eventually overlapped and filled an expanding public conversation with journalists drawing the 
attention of policy makers to our study of the Brexit bots. The same conversations revealed a public 
appreciation for the peer-review process as an instrument for professional accountability while also 
prompting the additional clarifications and caveats presented in this commentary piece. 
 
Ultimately, we would emphasize that public attention affords a new and broader cycle of scrutiny beyond 
one’s community of peers. We have reviewed the benefits and challenges attendant to the increased visibility 
of a peer-reviewed paper examining a sensitive and politically contentious topic. We have put forward our 
experience with public engagement as a negotiated outcome where the academic paper is only one of multiple 
seeds in fast-evolving public deliberations. Lastly, we would highlight the extraordinary and, in our 
experience, little recognized outlay of time and labour necessary to advance the public role of social science in 
an already crowded field of myriad institutional commitments by academics [70], namely to teaching, pastoral 
care, administration, and finally to our research activities. 
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